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LAW’S EVOLVING EMERGENT PHENOMENA: 
FROM RULES OF SOCIAL INTERCOURSE TO 
RULE OF LAW SOCIETY 
BRIAN TAMANAHA* 
INTRODUCTION 
Law involves institutions rooted in the history of a society that evolve in 
relation to surrounding social, psychological, cultural, economic, political, 
technological, and ecological influences. Law must be understood 
naturalistically, historically, and holistically. In my usage, naturalism views 
humans as social animals with natural traits and requirements, historicism 
presents law as historical manifestations that change over time, and holism 
sees law within social surroundings. These insights inform my perspective 
in A Realistic Theory of Law.1 While these propositions might seem 
obvious, few works in contemporary jurisprudence build around them.2  
In this essay, I draw on the notion of emergence to further elaborate the 
implications of naturalism, historicism, and holism for legal theory. 
Emergent phenomena arise in connection with objects or agents whose 
interactions produce qualitatively new features not found in its constituent 
parts.3 Two senses of emergence are contained in this idea: the emergent 
phenomenon is greater than the sum of its parts, and its emergence is a 
historical occurrence. Theories of emergence were originally articulated in 
a late nineteenth and early twentieth century reaction against scientific 
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reductionism.4 Originating in biological theories of evolution, emergence 
was extended to explain a range of phenomena, including the transition in 
levels from physics, to chemistry, to biology, to the emergence of 
consciousness from material brains, to the emergence of social structures 
from the actions of individuals. Emergence is enjoying renewed attention as 
a component of complexity theory.5 However, I will use the notion of 
emergence to illuminate aspects of law without grounding the analysis in 
complexity theory.6 
First, I introduce emergence. Then I describe five emergent aspects of 
law: fundamental rules of social intercourse; legal systems as organized 
coercion; specialized legal knowledge; a relatively fixed legal fabric; and a 
rule of law society. The first three emergent phenomena in combination 
constitute fundamental features of modern legal systems. The two 
remaining emergent phenomena relate to law in contemporary society. In 
the course of describing these aspects of law, I address implications for 
various important issues in legal theory exposed by seeing them as emergent 
phenomena. 
I. EMERGENT PHENOMENA  
The notion of emergence is applied to a host of natural and social 
phenomena and is taken up in several scientific disciplines. The basic idea 
is that something novel or additional arises out of the interaction of lower 
level parts.  Commonly offered examples of natural emergence are the 
combination of hydrogen and oxygen to form water, or sodium and chloride 
to form salt.7 Examples of social emergence include social practices, 
interaction patterns, cultural groups, and knowledge systems.8 With 
                                                
4.  See DAVID BLITZ, EMERGENT EVOLUTION: QUALITATIVE NOVELTY AND THE LEVELS OF 
REALITY (1992). Peter A. Corning, The Re-Emergence of “Emergence”: A Venerable Concept in Search 
of a Theory, 7 COMPLEXITY 18 (2002). 
5.  See generally JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE (2007).  
6.  The application of complexity theory to law raises vexing issues. One hurdle is the difficulty 
of identifying the measure of fitness and the fitness landscape for law as a complex adaptive system. It 
is not clear what law is adapting to and how success is to be measured. For a sophisticated effort, see 
J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society 
and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1437 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity 
Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal 
Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L. J. 849 (1996). Though his account is 
informative, Ruhl makes questionable assertions about the measure of fitness and he shifts between 
society as the unit and the legal system as the unit. 
7.  See Corning, supra note 4, at 22, 24. 















emergence, something additional comes into existence—a qualitatively new 
synergistic effect of the combination of parts and their interactions.9  
The meaning and characteristics of emergence are disputed. “Despite the 
recent proliferation of writings on the subject, it is still not clear what the 
term denotes or, more important, how emergence emerges.”10 An influential 
account in the inaugural issue of the journal Emergence is provided by 
Jeffrey Goldstein,11 who identifies six characteristics. First, emergent 
phenomena have novel features that are “neither predictable nor deducible 
from lower or micro-level components.”12 Second, they “appear as 
integrated wholes that tend to maintain some sense of identity over time.”13 
Third, “the locus of emergent phenomena occurs at a global or macro level,” 
so they must be observed at the macro level.14 Fourth, they “are not pre-
given wholes” but rather are dynamic and “arise as a complex system 
evolves over time.”15 Fifth, they can be recognized as wholes.16 Sixth, 
emergent wholes exert downward causal influences on their constituent 
parts; causation is therefore bidirectional, with lower levels producing 
higher, and higher levels shaping interaction at the lower.17 Emergent 
wholes, in sum, are coherently integrated through the interaction of their 
parts, they have certain traits present only at the level of the whole, they 
have causal consequences, they are resilient, they are dynamic and historical 
in the sense that they evolve in time, and no central control directs the 
whole.18 The emergent legal phenomena I discuss possess these features, 
though I mention them only when relevant. 
Five further clarifications bear on my application of emergence to legal 
phenomena. First, a plurality of levels and types can exist at which entities 
and relations cohere as wholes—family, sub-community, occupational 
group, social practice, etc.—each with its own character.19 Explanation 
focuses on the whole and the unique dynamics of each type at each level, 
                                                
9.  Corning, supra note 4, at 22–24. 
10.  Id. at 21.  
11.  Jeffrey Goldstein, Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues, 1 EMERGENCE 49 (1999). 
12.  Id. at 50. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. (“[E]mergents are . . . ostensively recognized.”). 
17.  Id. at 61–62. 
18.  For a concise summary of these characteristics, see Tom De Wolf & Tom Holvoet, 
Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined, in 
ENGINEERING SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 1, 3–5 (Sven A. Brueckner et al. eds., 2005). 
19.  Goldstein, supra note 11.  











though not to the exclusion of the parts.20 My discussions of fundamental 
rules of social intercourse, coercive legal systems, specialized legal 
knowledge, the legal fabric, and the rule of law society involve different 
levels and types of legal phenomena. 
Second, emergent wholes are historical products whose particular 
courses of development are contingent on initial conditions and continuous 
interaction with their environment.21 “Wholes produce unique combined 
effects, but many of these effects may be codetermined by the context and 
the interactions between the whole and its environment(s). In fact, many of 
the ‘properties’ of the whole may arise from such interactions.”22 Holism 
has two senses in my usage: attention to the emergent as a whole as well as 
attention to this whole within its environment. All five emergent legal 
phenomena are conveyed as wholes thoroughly immersed within and 
interacting with their surroundings. 
Third, emergence is not identical with self-organizing processes, though 
they share certain characteristics. Developed primarily in physics, computer 
science, and systems theory, theories of self-organization involve systems 
that produce autonomously generated, maintained, and changed order 
without external control and without purposeful creation of the order by 
agents.23 Emergent wholes involving human organizations, in contrast, can 
result from agents purposefully organizing to achieve functions or ends 
within the environment.24 Many legal phenomena are the product of 
purposive actions, though the wholes identified in this essay were not 
intentionally constructed as such at their inception.  
Fourth, emergence theory prompted a dispute over whether evolution can 
generate qualitative changes. While Charles Darwin argued evolution is 
continuous and incremental, Alfred Wallace, the co-founder of evolutionary 
theory, argued qualitative novelties can emerge through evolution.25 My 
application of emergence in effect takes both positions. The legal 
developments conveyed in this essay gradually evolved over eons of human 
history in various societies. Looking backward with the benefit of hindsight, 
I frame a series of legal phenomena as emergent wholes to draw out 
theoretical insights. 
                                                
20.  Id. at 61. For example, the levels of explanation from physics, to chemistry, to biology, to 
psychology. See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 5, at 45. 
21.  Corning, supra note 4, at 26. 
22.  Id. at 24. 
23.  Id. at 5–6. See generally De Wolf & Holvoet, supra note 18. Niklas Luhmann’s autopoeisis 
is a theory of self-organizing processes applied to law. See, e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
(Joseph Bednarz, Jr. trans., 1996). 
24.  See Corning, supra note 4, at 24. 














Finally, theorists disagree over whether emergent social phenomena are 
ontologically real or are merely theoretical constructs.26 Methodological 
individualists who discuss emergent social phenomena—including 
economists and individualist-oriented sociologists27—deny that there are 
irreducible social properties, and insist that all social phenomena can be 
explained through individuals and their interactions.28 Sociological holists 
assert emergent social phenomena exist, which though dependent on 
individuals and their interactions, have irreducible social properties and 
causal consequences.29 I prescind from ontological claims. What matters 
here is not whether emergent social phenomena (and the “wholes” invoked 
by holism30) actually exist but whether informative generalizations can be 
generated by seeing them as such.  “[E]mergence functions not so much as 
an explanation but rather as a descriptive term pointing to the patterns, 
structures, or properties that are exhibited on the macro-level.”31 Emergence 
for my purposes is a heuristic device that helps draw out significant aspects 
of law. 
II. EMGERGENT ASPECTS OF LAW  
A. Fundamental Rules of Social Intercourse  
H.L.A. Hart observed, “there are certain rules of conduct which any 
social organization must contain if it is to be viable.”32 These basic rules are 
tied to human nature and the requirements of life in social groups. We need 
food, clothing, and shelter, and we reproduce. We are physically vulnerable 
and roughly equal in our abilities. We are self-interested and also altruistic 
toward others. There are limited available resources to meet our needs and 
desires, so we must compete with others. We also cooperate with others to 
achieve objectives, and we engage in mutually beneficial exchanges. Our 
                                                
26.  Id. at 25. The reality of an emergent phenomenon arguably can be demonstrated through 
showing its causal effects. Goldstein, supra note 11, at 62. 
27.  Not all economists take this position. Arguing against methodological individualism, 
economic theorist Kenneth Arrow argued that “every economic model one can think of includes 
irreducibly social principles and concepts.” Kenneth J. Arrow, Methodological Individualism and Social 
Knowledge, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1994). He focused on the social pool of technical knowledge, 
which cannot be reduced to individuals, but also suggests other examples like socially produced tastes, 
organizations, and social rules and relations more generally. Id. at 4–5. 
28.  SAWYER, supra note 8, at 42–44, 73–78, 195–96. 
29.  Id. at 118–24, 210–23. 
30.  Alexander Rosenberg calls this “methodological” or “instrumental” holism. Alexander 
Rosenberg, Philosophy of Social Science 158 (3d ed. 2008). 
31.  Goldstein, supra note 11, at 58. 
32.  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 188 (1961). 











understandings are limited, and we have mixed motives and weak wills. 
These conditions, Hart asserted, give rise to the legal “protection for 
persons, property, and promises.”33 Arising out of natural necessity, he 
dubbed this the “minimum content of Natural Law.”34 Natural law theorist 
John Finnis, grounding his analysis not in human nature but in basic human 
goods, also identified universally existing legal requirements providing 
protection of property, protections for life and limb, restrictions on sexual 
activity, and the call for justice, among others.35 
Anthropological and psychological research has confirmed the existence 
of human universals, with a great deal of cultural variation in their 
expressions.36 Among a variety of universals (group living, shelter, tools, 
music, play, aesthetic standards, reciprocal gift giving, cosmology, etc.), 
those specifically related to law include property rights, prohibitions against 
murder, redress for violent injuries, marriage, inheritance, sexual 
restrictions, collectively binding decisions, rights and obligations related to 
status, and punishments for infractions.37 A naturalistic, evolutionary basis 
for a number of these universals is suggested by the fact that other primates 
(as well as other animals) exhibit enforcement of property rights, a sense of 
fairness, punishments for breach of reciprocity or cheating, and sexual 
restrictions by dominant males over mates.38  
The underlying sources of law-related universals have not been 
conclusively identified. A leading theory proposes that humans have 
evolved subject to natural selection to possess moral intuitions—immediate, 
automatic, and often emotional reactions to situations. These intuitive moral 
judgments enhance group cohesion and survival; reasoned moral analysis is 
secondary, mainly used to rationalize the initial intuitive reaction.39 
Jonathan Haidt, a proponent of the moral intuitionist model, asserts that 
universal moral intuitions are lodged in an ancient affective system within 
the human brain (experiencing positive and negative reactions like 
sympathy for suffering and anger at unfairness), which preceded language 
and the ability to engage in conscious moral reasoning.40 Evidence showing 
                                                
33.       Id. at 195. 
34.  Id. at 189 (emphasis omitted). 
35.  JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 83 (1980). 
36.  See DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991). 
37.  Id. at 136–40. See also ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR 
BEST AND WORST 271–72, 493–95 (Penguin Press 2017); KENT FLANNERY & JOYCE MARCUS, THE 
CREATION OF INEQUALITY: HOW OUR PREHISTORIC ANCESTOR SET THE STAGE FOR MONARCHY, 
SLAVERY, AND EMPIRE 54–65 (2012); EDWARD O. WILSON, THE SOCIAL CONQUEST OF EARTH 192–93 
(2012). 
38.  See MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL SENSE 
OF RIGHT AND WRONG 357–418 (2006). 
39.  Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 SCIENCE 998 (2007). 














the operation of this instinct include instantaneous moral reactions under 
experimental conditions (too quick for reasoning), neuroimaging that shows 
the activation of intuitionist brain regions, and multiple studies finding that 
toddlers and various species (crows, ravens, dogs, and monkeys) punish 
perceived injustice.41 
An ambitious competing theory is that humans possess an innate 
universal moral faculty analogous to Noam Chomsky’s innate language 
faculty.42 According to proponent John Mikhail, cognitive systems are 
structured in ways that generate mental representations and moral reactions 
to situations involving rules, concepts, and principles.43 The existence of 
this moral faculty is evidenced by: studies showing that young children 
exhibit an “intuitive jurisprudence” when they distinguish intentional from 
unintentional acts, use proportionality to determine punishment, and make 
other sorts of legal distinctions; the presence in every language of deontic 
concepts like “obligatory, permissible, and forbidden;” and universal 
prohibitions of murder, rape, and other injurious actions, along with 
concepts of causation and intention.44  
The moral intuition theory resembles Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
identification of the origins of law in primitive opinions of “vengeance,” “a 
feeling of blame,” “an opinion . . . that a wrong has been done.”45 His 
account was presaged by Adam Smith’s grounding of law in natural 
reactions to situations of injustice.46 “Fraud, falsehood, brutality, and 
violence” excite reactions of “scorn and abhorrence,” Smith observed, and 
murder, theft, and robbery “call loudest for vengeance and punishment.”47 
This innate sense of justice is the “main pillar that upholds” society, without 
which it would “crumble into atoms.”48 “Nature has implanted in the human 
breast that consciousness of ill desert, those terrors of merited punishment 
which attend upon its violation, as the great safeguards of the association of 
                                                
41.  SAPOLSKY, supra note 37, at 481–87. 
42.  For an accessible introduction to Chomsky’s theory, see STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE 
INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE (1994). 
43.  See John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future, 11 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 143 (2007). For a critique of universal moral grammar, see Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre 
Jacob, Universal Moral Grammar: A Critical Appraisal, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 373 (2007). The 
authors do not doubt the biological roots of morality, but rather question whether it is properly 
understood in terms parallel to Chomsky’s linguistic framework. 
44.  Mikhail, supra note 43, at 143 (emphasis omitted). 
45.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881). 
46.  See Lisa Herzog, Adam Smith’s Account of Justice Between Naturalness and Historicity, 52 
J. HIST. PHIL. 703, 705–07 (2014). 
47.  ADAM SMITH, THE ESSENTIAL ADAM SMITH 94, 116 (Robert L. Heilbroner ed., 1986). 
48.  Id. at 97.  











mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the violent, and to chastise the 
guilty.”49 Recent scientific studies lend support to Smith’s speculations, 
particularly the finding that when citizens administer punishments to norm 
violators—“altruistic punishments”—parts of their brains linked to pain, 
anger, and disgust are activated.50 Neurobiologist Robert Sapolsky observes 
that humans manifest brain states that provoke punishment at perceived 
injustice, which is essential to cooperation and sociality within groups.  
“The decision to punish, the passionate motivation to do so, is a frothy 
limbic state.”51   
Fundamental rules of social intercourse, viewed collectively, are 
emergent phenomena that evolved at least as far back as early hominid 
groups and have existed ever since (with variations in content and changes 
over time). Fueled by natural moral reactions against perceived wrongs, 
rules protecting property and persons, among other types of rules, emerged 
to help bond primitive hunter-gatherer groups.52  Haidt asserts that these 
fundamental rules “constrain[] individuals and tie[] them to each other to 
create groups that are emergent entities with new properties.”53 This can be 
modified to say that both social groups and the body of fundamental rules 
are co-emergent, intertwined phenomena that exist as wholes greater than 
the sums of their parts, which cannot be reduced without losing the quality 
of collective cohesiveness. 
Two jurisprudential implications follow from presenting Hart’s 
minimum content of natural law as pivotal to the emergence of primitive 
groups. The first is about when law came to exist. Scott Shapiro declares: 
“Those who live in bands . . . don’t have law.”54 “Indeed,” he asserts, “it is 
plausible to suppose that law is a comparatively recent invention, postdating 
the wheel, language, agriculture, art, and religion.”55 When making these 
assertions, Shapiro posits that law consists of an organized compulsory 
planning system that solves complex moral problems.56 However, if we see 
law in terms of recognizably familiar legal proscriptions on persons and 
property, marriage, sexual restrictions, debt obligations, along with other 
fundamental legal provisions,57 it follows that law is as old as human society 
itself. Law and primitive social groups are co-emergent phenomena that 
                                                
49.  Id. 
50.  See WILSON, supra note 37, 250–51. 
51.  SAPOLSKY, supra note 37, at 610. 
52.  See also Mikhail, supra note 43, at 150 (torts, contracts, and criminal law involve “the rules 
and representations that are implicit in common moral intuitions”). 
53.  Haidt, supra note 39, at 1000 (emphasis added). 
54.  SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 35 (2011).  
55.  Id. at 36. 
56.  Id. at 225. For a critique of this position, see TAMANAHA, supra note 1, ch. 3–4. 














could not exist without one another. Law in its origins was not an 
“invention” by anyone in the sense of a conscious creation, but rather 
evolved as an emergent product of collective behavior built on natural 
reactions to perceived wrongs. 
The second jurisprudential implication relates to recent efforts to explain 
the emergence and characteristics of law through economic reasoning. In 
“What is Law?,” Gillian Hadfield and Barry Weingast purport to shed 
“important light on fundamental questions of how, when and why 
distinctively legal order emerges in human societies.”58 Their model posits 
a seller and two buyers of goods who are independent and self-interested, 
with each buyer indifferent to how the other is treated by the seller.59 Using 
this model, Hadfield and Weingast show how actors would purposely create 
a legal order comprised of “general rules and impersonal abstract reasoning 
implemented by open, public, and neutral procedures.”60 Likewise applying 
an economic model, Daniele Bertolini purports to explain the emergence of 
spontaneous legal orders that protect property and punish fraud, robbery, 
theft, and so forth, without a centralized lawmaking authority. Among other 
assumptions, she posits that “community members have no incentives to 
cooperate by contributing to the collective action required to enforce 
efficient standards of behaviour.”61 In the absence of incentives, “there is a 
need for an economic explanation of how self-interested individuals 
surmount the ‘coordination’ and ‘incentive’ problems associated with norm 
creation and enforcement.”62 Analysts who begin with economic 
assumptions, as do Hadfield, Weingast, and Bertolini, must then say why 
people would engage in punishment of norm violators when the cost to each 
individual exceeds the expected benefit they receive.63 
 These accounts cannot suffice as actual historical explanations of why 
legal orders arose in human societies. They fail to recognize social groups 
are already functioning normative orders supported by moral reactions 
people naturally experience to harms and unfairness to themselves and 
others. Eminent biologist Edward O. Wilson remarked, “It turns out that 
people not only passionately wish to see wrongdoers and layabouts 
punished; they are also willing to take part in administering justice—even 
                                                
58.  Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What is Law? A Coordination Model of the 
Characteristics of Legal Order, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 471, 508 (2012); see also Daniele Bertolini, On 
the Spontaneous Emergence of Private Law, 29 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 5 (2016). 
59.  Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 58, at 477. 
60.  Id. at 474. 
61.  Bertolini, supra note 58, at 7. 
62.  Id. at 19. 
63.  Id. at 21. See Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 58, at 505–07. 











at a cost to themselves.”64  As Sapolsky put it, “It makes sense that we’ve 
evolved such that it is limbic froth that is at the center of punishing, and that 
a pleasurable dopaminergic surge rewards doing so…That rush of self-
righteous pleasure is what drives us to shoulder the costs.”65 A theory that 
begins by positing mutually disinterested rationally maximizing individuals 
detached from a community—a typical starting point for scholars who apply 
an economic perspective—cannot explain the initial emergence of legal 
orders in human societies because this model is a complete distortion of 
social life, not a mere simplifying abstraction. The social group and legal 
order emerged together in early hominid history through cooperation 
necessary for collective survival, and individuals have ever since operated 
within them.66 A related flaw in economic accounts of the origin of law is 
the assumption that the explanatory arrow goes from self-interested 
individuals to the conscious creation of a legal order. The causal arrow 
instead goes in both directions: the emergent legal order within the social 
group influences and channels the perceptions and interactions of 
individuals whose ideas, intuitive responses, and actions give rise to the 
legal order.     
B. Legal Systems As Organized Coercion Attached to Polities  
H.L.A. Hart described legal systems as “primary rules” of obligation 
applicable to the social group, combined with “secondary rules” utilized by 
legal officials to recognize, change, and apply the primary rules.67 Small 
social groups like early hunter-gatherers lived adequately under primary 
rules, he opined. But a bare regime of primary rules is inadequate for larger 
groups owing to three defects: there is uncertainty about what the rules are, 
the rules are static and cannot keep up with social change, and the absence 
of rules for application and punishment renders the system inefficient.68 The 
third deficiency is the most urgent, he indicates, for “many societies have 
remedies for this defect long before the other[s].”69 The addition of 
secondary rules remedies these defects: rules of recognition solve 
uncertainty, rules of change provide mechanisms for altering rules, and rules 
of adjudication and enforcement make the application of law more efficient. 
“[A]ll three remedies together are enough to convert the régime of primary 
rules into what is indisputably a legal system.”70  
                                                
64.  WILSON, supra note 37, at 250. 
65.  SAPOLSKY, supra note 37, at 610. 
66.  On the evolutionary roots of group cooperation, see WILSON, supra note 37, at 45–61. 
67.  HART, supra note 32, at 77–96. 
68.  Id. at 89–91. 
69.  Id. at 91. 














Hart’s analysis glosses over who made these changes and why. He asserts 
“societies” or “systems” purposefully created secondary rules to improve 
the functioning of law,71 saying “[m]ost systems have, after some delay, 
seen the advantages of further centralization of social pressure [in legal 
institutions].”72 Along similar lines, Hadfield and Weingast attribute the 
emergence of legal systems to “deliberate” efforts to create systems that 
effectively serve the coordination function of law.73 Explanations of this sort 
rely on farsighted actors to intentionally create working systems to serve 
social purposes.   
A darker account of the emergence of legal systems seldom gets serious 
attention from legal theorists: legal systems initially emerged and served as 
coercive systems of legal domination attached to ruling polities. This second 
emergent legal phenomenon encompasses the inception of legal coercion in 
complex chiefdoms that culminated in early states with established legal 
systems.74 Adam Smith explicitly tied the emergence of law to interests of 
elites.75  
[W]hen . . . some have great wealth and others nothing, it is necessary 
that the arm of authority should be continually stretched forth, and 
permanent laws or regulations made which may ascertain the 
property of the rich from the inroads of the poor, who would 
otherwise continually make incroachments upon it, and settle in what 
the infringement of this property consists and in what cases they will 
be liable to punishment.76  
Nineteenth-century jurist Rudolph von Jhering asserted, “Whoever will 
trace the legal fabric of a people to its ultimate origins will reach 
innumerable cases where the force of the stronger has laid down the law for 
the weaker.”77 “Law without force is an empty name, a thing without reality, 
for it is force, in realizing the norms of law, that makes law what it is and 
                                                
71.  He refers to historical changes in the law in the course of his explanation. See id. at 91 (“The 
history of law . . . suggest[s] . . . many societies have remedies for this defect”); id. at 92 (“as a matter 
of history this step from the pre-legal to the legal . . . .”). 
72.  Id. at 95. 
73.  Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 58, at 491, 505. 
74.  Wilson suggests that the ascent from chiefdoms to states occurred through naturalistic 
processes propelling expansion and increases in social complexity. WILSON, supra note 37, at 98–103. 
75.  See Andrew Skinner, Adam Smith: Society and Government, in PERSPECTIVES IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 195 (Elspeth Attwooll ed., 1977). 
76.  ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 208 (R. L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (emphasis 
added).  
77.  RUDOLPH VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 185 (Isaac Husik trans., Boston Book 
Co. 1913).  











ought to be.”78 The modern tendency to assume the legitimacy of law 
derives from consent obscures the possibility that effective force itself 
confers legitimacy. In earlier periods, Jhering observed, people “did not 
look upon force with our eyes; they saw nothing improper in such a 
condition; nought detestable and damnable, but only what was natural and 
self-evident. Force as such made an impression on them and was the only 
kind of greatness they could appreciate.”79 
This alternative theory holds that coercive systems of legal enforcement 
initially emerged through the actions of a Big Man (from among a ruling 
oligarchy)80 and his extended kin group or clan, prepared to exert force in 
the name of law in return for rents extracted through domination. This 
theory uses Max Weber’s assertion that law “is externally guaranteed by the 
probability that physical or psychological coercion will be applied by a staff 
of people in order to bring about compliance or avenge violation.”81 The 
warriors aligned with the Big Man constitute the staff applying legal 
coercion to enforce rules that maintain the authority of the rulers and elite. 
The Big Man cum paramount chief and his supporters “live on the surplus 
accumulated by the tribe, employing it to tighten control upon the tribe, to 
regulate trade, and to wage war with neighbors.”82 Slowly crystalizing into 
standing legal institutions, legal systems provided the enforcement muscle 
that backed ruling polities as they extended their control within society, 
gradually coming to enforce fundamental rules of social intercourse, resolve 
disputes, and maintain internal order. After generations (surviving 
challenges by internal rivals and external threats of conquest), domination 
by the Big Man and his clan became hereditary rule (via chiefly lineages) 
supported by property rights and culturally entrenched social ranks (sub-
chiefs, priests, warriors, artisans, commoners, serfs, slaves). The paramount 
chief controls the most fertile land and sources of food, deriving rents and 
tributes from sub-chiefs and commoners, fighting wars to gain wealth, 
rewarding warriors with spoils of war, and exchanging gifts with 
neighboring chiefdoms to obtain luxury items and desirable goods that 
enhanced their status.83  
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As populations increased in settled agrarian societies and polities 
expanded their reach by conquering neighboring territories, bureaucratic 
states coalesced under rulers and a professional class of administrators.84 
“One of the most dramatic innovations of states is that the central 
government monopolizes the use of force, dispensing justice according to 
rules of law.”85 The state apparatus administered punishment according to 
established laws and collected taxes to support the bureaucratic state.86 
Rulers, priests, administrators, and judges were drawn from a hereditary 
aristocracy that controlled landed wealth, using commoners, serfs, and 
slaves—through debt servitude or capture—to work the land under 
arrangements enforced by law.87 
Religious ideologies legitimated early rulers and the legal order, as well 
as helped secure compliance with law under threat of divine punishment. In 
early states:  
Laws were often claimed to originate with the gods, who transmitted 
them to humans through the proclamations of rulers. The Aztec term 
for ‘laws’, nahuatilli, meant ‘a set of commands’. Laws were a means 
by which human society was not only regulated but also aligned with 
a cosmic order that was profoundly hierarchical. The Babylonian 
word mêsaru and the Egyptian m3’t referred both to the cosmic order 
and to legal justice. The Inka state claimed that subjects’ commission 
of crimes such as murder, witchcraft, theft, and neglect of religious 
cults threatened the health of the king and considered them sacrilege. 
Later evidence from China indicates that law (fa) was believed to 
have been created by superhuman beings in accordance with divine 
models and interests. To promote order on earth, rulers sought to 
suppress blood feuds and punish murder, treason, theft, incest, and 
many other forms of misconduct. 
Supernatural powers were believed to support the legal process by 
revealing guilt or innocence through oracles and ordeals and by 
punishing oath-breakers. The gods punished individuals whose 
crimes went undetected or unpunished by humans. The Babylonian 
king Hammurabi claimed to have assembled his law code at the 
command of the god Utu, or Shamash, who, because as the sun god 
he saw everything that humans did, was also the patron deity of 
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justice. Promulgating this law code gave Hammurabi an earthly role 
analogous to that of Enlil, the chief executive deity of the Sumerian 
pantheon. The laws proclaimed by the Aztec ruler Mochtezuma I 
were described as ‘flashes that the great king…[had] sown in his 
breast, from the divine fire, for the total health of his kingdom.’ This 
claim referred to the divine powers that were implanted in the Aztec 
monarch at the time of his enthronement. The early Chinese believed 
that improper conduct was supernaturally punished.88 
In many early legal systems, in addition to longstanding customary and 
religious laws, law is what the ruler declares. The Justinian Code makes 
this explicit: “What has pleased the prince has the force of law;” and “The 
prince is not bound by the law.”89  
According to this theory, legal systems initially formed as organized 
coercion—in religious ideological clothing90—attached to the polity that 
maintained the ruling elite and a hierarchical society, along with laws on 
property, personal injuries, debt obligations, family unions, sexual 
restrictions, and sacred matters. Anthropologists, political scientists, and 
historians who study chiefdoms and early states provide abundant evidence 
for this account.91 A leading scholar of state development remarked, “there 
is always found great inequality in (early) states. Some people, the happy 
few, are rich and powerful and all others, the great majority, are poor and 
powerless.”92 A scholar of early civilizations observed, “The state serves, 
thus, to maintain the privileged position of a ruling class that is largely based 
on the exploitation and economic degradation of the masses.”93 In a work 
of comparative politics written two millennia ago, Aristotle saw “in some 
states the entire aim both of the laws and of the constitution is to give men 
despotic power over their neighbours.”94 A scholar characterizing the early 
medieval period noted, “To the German successor-kingdoms of the Western 
Roman Empire, the monarch was not primarily the head of a territorial State 
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but a personal tribal leader; it might not be too wide of the mark to think of 
him as a gangster chief, surrounded by his henchmen and living with them 
off the country they had conquered.”95 The use of law as a system of 
coercion over a population was also common to empires and colonization.96  
 The formation of legal systems as organized systems of coercion to 
maintain polities and social hierarchy has naturalistic roots.  Non-human 
primates engage in power struggles to establish dominance relationships, 
which determine access to food, preferred resting spots, and mates.97 
Success in these rivalries relates not only to size, strength, and age, but also 
to the creation of coalitions with allies to fight to overturn an existing 
order.98 Chimpanzees hunt in organized packs for live animals and fight for 
territory with rival groups.99 Human societies past and present have  been 
characterized by territorial control, dominance relationships, and status 
hierarchies, from subjugating and extracting wealth from weaker 
neighboring populations, to aristocratic and caste systems, to male 
domination over women, to modern forms of inequality enforced by 
property law.  Humans are “just like numerous other social species in terms 
of having marked status differences among individuals and hierarchies that 
emerge from those differences,”100 although humans alone belong to 
multiple hierarchies attached to different criteria (work, wealth, religion, 
race or ethnicity, attractiveness, athletic ability, social circles or clubs, 
etc.).101 Neurological studies reveal that human brains are highly attuned to 
the recognition of status differences, and even “bear the imprint of social 
status.”102  Uniquely among primates, however, human societies establish 
dominance hierarchies passed to offspring through lineage based status 
ranks or accumulated wealth.103 “When humans invented socioeconomic 
status,” Sapolsky remarked, “they invented a way to subordinate like 
nothing that hierarchical primates had ever seen before.”104 
Natural intuitions have also played a role. In addition to intuitions about 
harm and fairness mentioned previously, Haidt asserts that evolutionary 
foundations exist for three further categories of universal moral intuitions: 
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“there are also widespread intuitions about ingroup-outgroup dynamics and 
the importance of loyalty; there are intuitions about authority and the 
importance of respect and obedience; and there are intuitions about bodily 
and spiritual purity and the importance of living in a sanctified rather than 
a carnal way.”105 All three intuitions support allegiance to divinely 
appointed ruling authorities and compliance with law backed by organized 
force. The first binds a populace to their ruler to defend against or to attack 
neighboring powers;106 the second renders obedience to the political 
authority and law morally compelling;107 and the third relies on religious, 
aristocratic, and caste ideologies to sanctify the legally enforced hierarchical 
arrangement. 
“Law surely is not the gunman situation writ large, and legal order is 
surely not to be thus simply identified with compulsion,” Hart insisted. 108 
There is truth in this assertion. For millennia, law in many societies has been 
identified with justice, right, and the common good, charged with protecting 
the weak and restricting the powerful.109 Recall that, as mentioned earlier, 
humans have intuitive reactions against injustice and unfairness, which law 
reflects and enforces (as informed by religious, cultural, economic, and 
political ideologies). Humans have mixes of selfish and altruistic traits, with 
the balance in favor of the latter in ways that are oriented to the good of the 
group.110 Wilson explains: “Human beings are prone to be moral—do the 
right thing, hold back, give aid to others, sometimes even at personal risk—
because natural selection has favored those interactions of group members 
benefitting the group as a whole.”111 Empathy, cooperation, and the desire 
to punish wrongdoers all follow.112 The claim that law represents justice is 
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a manifestation of these natural human impulses, with important 
consequences in shaping what is recognized as law and what law is used to 
do. The identification of law with justice compels officials to explain their 
actions as consistent with justice and fairness and provides a critical 
standard the populace can raise against officials. The claim to represent 
justice thereby points law in the direction of the good. 
Yet legal systems look very much like a gunman writ large backing 
ruling polities and elites when we consider how they formed and have 
operated in many societies throughout history and today (see North Korea 
and Syria). Coercive legal systems have commonly served as the enforcer 
for ruling polities and social-economic hierarchies and to dominate 
disfavored groups, with the law bolstered by religious, cultural, economic, 
and political ideologies that legitimate these actions. Again, we can learn 
from Jhering: 
Force produces law immediately out of itself, and as a measure of 
itself, law evolving as the politics of force. It does not therefore 
abdicate to give the place to law, but whilst retaining its place it adds 
to itself law as an accessory element belonging to it, and becomes 
legal force.113 
Coercion is a principal feature of legal systems attached to the polity as 
emergent phenomena, epitomized in the claim of modern states to possess 
a monopoly over the application of force. This historical fact exposes the 
unreality of assertions by leading contemporary legal philosophers that 
coercive force is not an essential feature of law.114   
Once coercive legal systems became entrenched within the polity and 
society, competing social groups and individuals strove to shape law and 
use it to advance their interests. “All the law in the world has been obtained 
by strife,” Jhering wrote. “Every principle of law which obtains had first to 
be wrung by force from those who denied it.”115 When contesting groups 
and individuals battle over law, their arguments are often couched in 
language of justice and the common good, for that is what law purports to 
represent. But “as in every struggle, the issue is decided not by the weight 
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of reason, but by the relative strength of opposing forces.” 116 Jhering 
identified these battles as a force propelling the continuous evolution of law. 
Notwithstanding the dark overtones of his account, Jhering emphasized 
that law provides fundamental benefits for society. “Certain legal principles 
are found among all peoples; murder and robbery are everywhere forbidden; 
State and property, family and contract are met everywhere. Consequently, 
in these cases, one may urge, we actually have . . . absolute ‘legal truths,’ 
over which history has no power.”117 The battles between competing 
interests benefit society in the long run, he believed, because social views 
of justice and an ethical sense are reflected in law. Jhering’s insight is that, 
along with maintaining social order and views of justice and the common 
good, legal systems also reflect and enforce social, economic, and political 
hierarchies and sources of power. The first two emergent phenomena of 
law—fundamental legal rules of social intercourse and coercive systems 
attached to polities—have proven to be enduring components of human 
societies. 
C. Legal Specialists and Legal Knowledge 
Rules of recognition, Hart asserted, solve legal uncertainty by clearly 
identifying primary rules, and judges follow rules of adjudication “to make 
authoritative determinations of the question whether, on a particular 
occasion, a primary rule has been broken.”118 Hadfield and Weingast 
conclude that law involves general, stable, predictable, and clear rules, with 
disputes decided in accordance with law through impersonal and public 
reasoning.119 They endorse Hart’s position on secondary rules, affirming 
that “[t]he capacity to articulate, clarify, and adapt the content of a 
classification system [for binding rules] is fundamental to a concept of law 
. . . .”120 Legal clarity has two distinct audiences in these formulations: the 
populace and legal officials.121 Legal clarity for the populace is crucial 
because it provides individuals with advance knowledge of legal constraints 
and consequences of their actions. Hart identified general obedience to legal 
rules by the populace as an essential condition for the existence of a legal 
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system.122  As legal philosopher Andrei Marmor declared, law serves the 
“pivotal function of guiding human conduct.” 123 
The claim by legal theorists that the populace is guided by law is a 
misleading idealization. “People can only be guided by rules or 
prescriptions if they know about the existence of the rule or prescription.”124   
However, owing to the impact of specialized legal knowledge maintained 
by legal professionals, magnified by advancing complexity and 
proliferation of law over time, people do not know about the vast bulk of 
law. Specialized legal knowledge through which state legal systems operate 
is the third emergent phenomenon. Together with the two preceding 
emergent phenomena, they constitute a triumvirate of fundamental features 
of modern state law.   
Throughout its history, the common law has failed to provide clarity to 
the populace on what the law is. A common law jurist might respond that 
authoritative precedent identifies law, but that is dubious. Consider this 
colloquy recorded in the 1345 Year Book on a case in which the judges 
departed from a previous case: 
R. Thorpe [counsel] . . . I think you will wish to do what others have 
done in the same case, or else we do not know what the law is. 
HILLARY, J. [judge]. The law is the will of the justices. 
STONORE, J. [judge]. No, the law is reason.125 
As John Dawson explains, at the time “law was an immense body of 
complex rules carried forward mainly through an oral tradition.”126 Law was 
located in writs and specialized pleading forms, as well as in past decisions 
that judges and pleaders “recollected.”127 “[P]articular cases could survive 
as law only as they were absorbed into the common learning of the élite 
group.”128 
“Legal historians widely agree that before the eighteen century there was 
no firm doctrine of stare decisis in English common law.”129 Precedent 
could not be treated as binding in England for a very practical reason. Until 
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the latter half of the nineteenth century, reports of judicial cases were 
published by private parties for profit, varying greatly in quality. Certain 
reports in the eighteenth century “were so manifestly unreliable that judges 
complained against them bitterly and even forbade lawyers to cite them in 
court.”130 Throughout this period, “[t]o laymen the system [of property law] 
was wholly unintelligible,” legal historian A.W.B. Simpson concluded.131 
The arcane complexity of law also erected a barrier to legislative reform. 
To the lawyers, who alone had sufficient grasp of the law to have 
done something about it, the law of property, and particularly the law 
of future interests, became a great mystery, an elaborate network of 
rules so interrelated that any radical legislative interference might 
destroy the assumed coherence of the whole, and throw men’s 
security in their property into confusion.132 
Legal uncertainty was also a problem in the United States through the 
early twentieth century.  A 1904 article in the Yale Law Journal lamented:  
In this condition of affairs judges indulge in the delusion that they are 
observing stare decisis merely because they cite precedents. The 
truth is that, much in the same manner that expert witnesses are 
procurable to give almost any opinions that are desired, judicial 
precedents may be found for any proposition that a counsel, or a 
court, wishes established, or to establish.133  
Elihu Root, in the 1916 Presidential Address to the ABA, similarly noted: 
The vast and continually increasing mass of reported decisions which 
afford authorities on almost every side of almost every question 
admonish us that by the mere following of precedent we should soon 
have no system of law at all, but the rule of the Turkish cadi who is 
expected to do in each case what seems to him to be right . . . .134 
The common law is clearer today thanks to treatises, restatements, and 
model codes written in the past century—but this renders the law clear to 
legal specialists, not the populace. Chief Justice Lord Bingham delivered a 
1998 speech advocating the enactment of a Criminal Code, quoting a 
century old statement of a jurist: 
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The criminal law is entirely different. It is incoherent and 
inconsistent. State almost any general principle and you will find one 
or more leading cases which contradict it. It is littered with 
distinctions which have no basis in reason but are mere historical 
accidents. I am in favour of codification of the criminal law because 
I see no other way of reducing a chaotic system to order, of 
eliminating irrational distinctions and of making the law reasonably 
comprehensible, accessible and certain.135 
Justice Bingham endorsed this assessment, asserting “the cure now can only 
be achieved by codification.”136 “[A]nybody who may want to know the law 
on a particular subject should be able to turn to a chapter of the Code, and 
there find the law he is in search of explained in a few intelligible and well-
constructed sentences. . . .”137 England and Wales still do not have a criminal 
code.  
A person in the United States today who wants to discern tort laws 
applicable to her conduct would have great difficulty discovering it. Never 
mind that statements of tort law—a mixture of common law doctrines and 
statutes—are written in legalese that is difficult to fully comprehend without 
legal training. The threshold hurdle is to find it. A state’s pattern jury 
instructions provide statements of tort law, though few lay people would 
know that is where they should look. Nor will the jury instructions be easy 
to locate. The Missouri Court website unhelpfully announces: “The Court 
does not prepare or publish a compilation of its Missouri Approved 
Instructions for civil cases. Nevertheless, such compilations are available 
from various commercial and other entities.”138 This is tantamount to telling 
people to call a lawyer.  
My argument is not that law is pervasively unclear and uncertain. Legal 
specialists have an understanding of most areas of law and know how to 
figure out what they do not know, although uncertainties and open questions 
regularly arise. However, for the populace, the law is hard to find, hard to 
understand, and obscure in its operation. Studies have found that lay beliefs 
about law on important matters, common law as well as statutory, are 
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incorrect a significant percentage of time across a range of legal subjects.139  
The sheer volume of law in contemporary society insures that people are 
ignorant of the vast bulk of law.  There are over 3,000 federal crimes and 
another 300,000 federal regulations that carry criminal punishments, along 
with innumerable state and municipal crimes and regulations.140  “A citizen 
who wants to abide by the law has no quick and easy way to find out what 
the law actually is . . . .”141  
The only way for most people to determine what the law is on a given 
topic is to consult a lawyer. But legal theorists should not assume access to 
lawyers provides legal certainty for the general populace142 (as 
distinguished from commercial actors who retain lawyers). A large 
proportion of Americans with legal problems—including child custody and 
support, employment, housing, etc.—forgo legal remedies outright or 
handle them without retaining a lawyer.143 A recent report issued by the 
U.K. judiciary found, “The single, most pervasive and intractable weakness 
of our civil courts is that they simply do not provide reasonable access to 
justice for any but the most wealthy individuals.”144 Commercial actors and 
wealthy individuals use legal specialists extensively to arrange their affairs 
and assert their legal rights—handsomely compensating lawyers in the 
process—so for these groups the theoretical assertion that law provides 
advanced notice is true. But many people dealing with personal matters 
cannot afford to retain lawyers.  
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Jeremy Bentham and Max Weber paid significant attention to legal 
specialists and their monopoly over legal knowledge. Bentham castigated 
the common law for pervasive jargon, technicalities, and fictions that render 
it obscure to the public.145 Comprehensible only to members of the legal 
guild, this enabled lawyers to boost their fees, raise their status, and conceal 
deficiencies in the law.146 Cases, statutes and regulations are difficult to 
comprehend without a baseline of knowledge of legal practices and 
procedures, concepts, technicalities, methods of interpretation, and modes 
of analysis maintained by legal specialists. Legal formalism pervades law, 
the operation of which is not familiar to most people. Legal rules are formal 
in the sense that they are general proscriptions addressing categories of 
conduct that specify legal consequences to follow in concrete contexts of 
application.147 Formalistic qualities of modern bodies of legal knowledge 
were enhanced through the efforts of legal specialists toward “increasingly 
specialized juridical and logical rationality and systematization,” Weber 
explained, until it finally assumes “an increasingly logical sublimation and 
deductive rigor and develop[s] an increasingly rational technique in 
procedure.”148 The coherence of legal knowledge as a whole generates 
“inner necessities,” including “increasingly logical interpretation of 
meaning in relation to the legal norms themselves as well as in relation to 
legal transactions.”149  
Legal doctrines and concepts (legal personality, intention, malice, etc.) 
carry technical meanings across various legal contexts, so efforts at 
conceptual consistency and systematic arrangement, Jeremy Waldron 
points out, help jurists manage the implications of this “de facto 
systematicity.”150 This is “law’s system,” as Gerald Postema put it, whereby 
particular legal actions—from a specific contract, to a legislative act or 
judicial decision, to a will or transfer of property, to a bank loan, etc.—
obtain their legal meaning and implications within a taken-for-granted 
backdrop of legal doctrines and concepts.151  This juridical backdrop is the 
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legal tradition, which evolved to acquire its present content and form, 
including many historical vestiges, through the efforts of generations of 
jurists modifying law to adjust to external influences while striving to render 
law systematic.152  Also propelling the urge to construct legal systematicity 
is the tendency of theoretically minded jurists to seek analytical clarity, 
consistency, and order in law. A loop of reciprocal causation exists in which 
legal concepts and doctrines—continuously added to and modified in 
connection with surrounding changes and social battles over law—in the 
aggregate constitute legal knowledge as a whole, which in turn influences 
the contours of particular constituent legal concepts and doctrines and their 
development. 
Once legal specialists monopolize legal knowledge attached to the 
operation of the legal system, inputs from the cultural, social, economic, 
political, and technological environment are absorbed on law’s own terms, 
thereby transformed. Through this process of incorporation, results 
produced by the legal system may diverge from expectations of lay people. 
A substantial majority of the population, for example, was opposed to the 
Supreme Court decision that corporations have constitutionally protected 
free speech rights that prohibit limits on campaign contributions.153 “Such 
disappointments are inevitable indeed,” Weber observed, “where the facts 
of life are juridically ‘construed’ in order to make them fit the abstract 
propositions of law and in accordance with the maxim that nothing can exist 
in the realm of law unless it can be ‘conceived’ by the jurist in conformity 
with those ‘principles’ which are revealed to him by juristic science.”154  
Legal specialists are thus oriented in two directions in perpetual tension: 
keeping law in sync with surrounding social influences and changes, and 
maintaining the conceptual coherence of law. As Friedrich Savigny first 
made clear: 
A two-fold spirit is indispensable to the jurist; the historical, to seize 
with readiness the peculiarities of every age and every form of law; 
and the systematic, to view every notion and every rule in lively 
connection and co-operation with the whole [legal science], that is, 
in the only true and natural relation.155 
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The latter orientation constantly pulls legal specialists towards satisfying 
the inner necessities of a coherent body of legal knowledge. Savigny 
warned, however, that if legal science “veers away” too much from concrete 
social relations, it “can reach a high degree of formal perfection, but it will 
nonetheless be devoid of any true reality.”156 
The emergent phenomenon of systematic legal knowledge constructed 
by legal specialists attached to the legal system constitutes a filter through 
which surrounding factors are brought into law in reconstructed form. An 
essential consequence of this whole is that jurists collectively are committed 
to perpetuate law’s system as a value in itself—dedicated to the proposition 
that the integrity of law and legal knowledge are goods worth maintaining. 
Jurists are the group in society most devoted to this proposition, which 
significantly contributes to the functioning of law.   
When this emergent phenomenon arose cannot be precisely identified, 
and the answer varies depending on the history of particular legal systems. 
A pivotal factor was the development of institutions for the creation, 
preservation, and transmission of legal knowledge. In a sweeping historical 
survey of Western legal thought extending back more than two millennia, 
Donald Kelley shows that over many centuries “the language of the law has 
been preserved—through intellectual habits, professional conventions, 
technical terms, proverbs, maxims, and the like;”157 at least since the twelfth 
century, legal professionals have maintained “its structure and texture, 
including general categories, time-tested assumptions and ‘maxims,’ 
standards of judgment, and methods of analysis.”158 Legal specialists have 
long monopolized legal knowledge attached to coercive legal systems, at 
least in the West, which likely will continue far into the future. The 
monopoly of legal knowledge attached to the official legal system is 
enduring and resilient. 
Legal knowledge is complex and inaccessible for reasons entirely apart 
from law’s technical system. Social, economic, technological, and political 
life are increasingly complex, and law is correspondingly complex as it 
struggles to keep up with surrounding technical complexities that legal 
officials themselves sometimes have difficulty comprehending. A feature of 
modern society identified by social theorist Anthony Giddens is the 
“disembedding” or “lifting out” from local social relations of expert bodies 
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of knowledge—including law, medicine, engineering, etc.—which 
pervasively influence the circumstances of our existence, but which lay 
people lack the capacity to understand.159  Legal theorists recognize that 
technology, medicine, engineering, and other specializations are beyond the 
ken of the public, yet overlook that the same holds for legal knowledge. 
Legal rules do not substantially guide and provide notice to the populace, 
notwithstanding repeated avowals by legal theorists.  “It is . . . the essence 
of following a rule that one is aware of the rule one follows.”160  Yet it is 
undeniable that most people do not know the overwhelming bulk of law, 
and even lawyers do not know much law outside their area of expertise.  A 
centuries old common law maxim is “everyone is presumed to know the 
law.”161  Jurists have long acknowledged, however, that this proposition “is 
on its face absurd.”162 The justification for the maxim was not factual 
accuracy, but a prudential government policy that purportedly incentivizes 
people to know the law and holds them responsible regardless.163  Legal 
theorists who categorically assert that legal rules guide the populace in 
effect implicitly adopt as true a maxim that is known to be a convenient 
fiction.  The actual relationship between law and the populace is otherwise, 
as I describe later. 
D. The Relatively Fixed Legal Fabric  
Contemporary society involves countless millions of actors (natural and 
artificial) engaged in an incalculable number and range of social, economic, 
and political interactions. Beneath these interactions in advanced capitalist 
societies lay a relatively fixed legal fabric. Not intentionally created by 
anyone, this legal fabric is an emergent phenomenon that gradually 
coalesced in the past two centuries owing mainly to the aggregate impact of 
five factors.164   
The first factor is a monumental change in social action involving the 
proliferation of organizations extensively using law in their affairs that 
coincided with rapid demographic expansion, industrialization, and 
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urbanization. We live in “a society of organizations,” “the key phenomenon 
of our time.”165 “It is the corporate actors, the organizations that draw their 
power from persons and employ that power to corporate ends, that are the 
primary actors in the social structure of modern society,” social theorist 
James Coleman declared.166 Organizations engage with law in a variety of 
ways: they are created by and structured through law; they use contracts 
with employees, customers, suppliers, and sources of financing; they 
exercise property rights to acquire, preserve, and transfer assets; tort law 
and criminal law apply to their actions; corporate law and securities laws 
govern the operation of private corporations; various regulatory regimes 
apply to their relations with employees, the products or services they sell, 
etc.; government organizations wield law to achieve their purposes; and 
much more. 
The second factor is that a huge portion of legal arrangements involve 
fixed-form contracts. Renting an apartment, taking out a mortgage, hooking 
up gas and electricity, acquiring a credit card, obtaining a loan, opening a 
bank account, signing with a phone carrier, downloading a computer 
program, entering an employment relationship, purchasing goods, attending 
a sporting event or concert—for these and innumerable other daily 
transactions, while price can be haggled and quality and quantity decided, 
the legal arrangement is preset. People bind themselves to form contracts 
filled with detailed legal language specifying terms and conditions, often 
without thinking twice about it. These contracts usually cannot be 
individually tailored through negotiation except by wealthy or powerful 
parties. Form contracts are ubiquitous because they are cheaper and more 
efficient to use, and their use reflects the superior bargaining powers of 
private and public organizations over the parties with which they interact.   
The third factor is the multitude of instrumental uses of law by 
government organizations to achieve social purposes. Layers of laws and 
regulations address a vast range of activities, setting minimum terms and 
restricting options. Health regulations impose standards for food and drugs; 
consumer protection regulations impose warranties and protect purchasers 
from fraud; safety regulations cover the features and operation of trains, 
planes, buses, automobiles, and so on; safety and sanitation features are 
required in homes, rental properties, hotels, and restaurants; labor laws set 
rules for collective bargaining and employment laws apply to work 
conditions; workman compensation laws cover injuries suffered at work; 
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licensing requirements apply to countless occupations; medical insurance, 
life insurance, vehicle insurance, annuities, pensions, banks accounts and 
loans, etc., have minimum requirements and restrictions; environmental 
restrictions apply to pesticide use, particulates released from factories, and 
so on. The list of legally imposed terms and conditions is endless and 
constantly added to. 
The fourth factor is a combination of the effects of law as a body of 
specialized knowledge and the tendency within law to settle on, copy, and 
repeat standard words, phrases, and provisions. This involves the 
formalization of legal terminology in packets of settled legal meaning.167 
Many legal agreements are cut-and-paste products comprised of previously 
interpreted and utilized words and phrases. Legal actors repeat technical 
words and phrases because their implications are relatively known and 
predictable, and imitation is more cost effective and less risky than drafting 
entirely new provisions. Standard templates are common in legal offices for 
transactions, complaints, motions, briefs, and other legal documents. Legal 
standardization builds on and incorporates generally fixed aspects of 
background legal rules, like established rules of property, contract, and torts, 
and incorporates terms and requirements of various sorts legally imposed 
by government. 
The fifth factor is the passage of time (historicism) and the 
interconnectedness of law within society (holism). Long co-evolution 
within society renders existing legal doctrines into normalized background 
aspects of social interaction.168 Routine affairs build on top of and around 
laws (though social actors may also ignore law or rearrange their actions to 
circumvent it). Mortgages, for instance, developed over the course of 
several centuries in English law via the interaction of evolving common law 
property doctrines with statutes promoting selected economic interests.169 
Mortgages now occupy a pivotal place in real property financing and can be 
modified in various respects but cannot be abolished without wreaking 
economic havoc. The same is true of many other longstanding legal 
arrangements—in principle completely alterable but in practice not. 
Resistance to change is not just passive inertia. As Jhering remarked, “In 
the course of time, the interests of thousands of individuals and of whole 
classes, have become bound up with the existing principles of law in such a 
manner that these cannot be done away with, without doing the greatest 
injury to the former.”170 Parties who benefit from existing arrangements will 
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fight to defend them.  Law and surrounding social and economic relations 
thereby become mutually anchored and relatively fixed though lengthy 
coexistence.  
The emergent legal fabric for social, economic, and political interaction 
has two dimensions: omnipresence and fixity. The omnipresence of law is 
largely the product of the first and third factors. The proliferation of 
organizations extensively using law has brought a mountainous 
multiplication of law. Uses of law by government organizations to advance 
myriad projects in the social arena brings an extensive penetration of law 
into social and economic affairs. Supplementing these two factors, 
individuals use law in personal matters outside of interaction with 
organizations—marriage, divorce, property transactions, wills, trusts, and 
so forth. As the population increases, the absolute quantity of law grows. 
Multiple factors contribute to the fixity of the fabric: the ubiquity of repeated 
standardized form contracts; government regulations once in place are hard 
to dislodge; systematic elements of legal knowledge as a whole and the 
tendency within law to copy and repeat; and the passage of time and 
interconnectedness of law within society. This fixity is only relatively so 
because aspects of the legal fabric are constantly changing to reflect new 
surrounding developments and battles among competing interests to use law 
for their purposes. These modifying influences enter through political 
mechanisms (legislative, regulatory, executive orders, municipal orders, 
etc.), through court decisions altering law, and through the work of jurists 
adjusting law to meet new circumstances or effectuate legal change. At any 
given moment, however, the bulk of the fabric remains a stable backdrop 
for life in advanced capitalist societies. The emergent legal fabric is integral 
to and interacts continuously with its environment. 
Law was not pervasive in society two centuries ago. On the demand side, 
there were vastly fewer organizations using law, vastly fewer instrumental 
uses of law by governments, and vastly fewer people. On the supply side, 
state legal institutions lacked the capabilities necessary to provide large 
volumes of law with extensive reach. Not until effective bureaucratic legal 
organizations had developed and multiplied in number—as part of the rise 
of bureaucratic organizations more generally—could legal mechanisms be 
utilized so extensively. The legal fabric is not the result of law in isolation, 
it must be emphasized, but of modern social developments, in particular the 
rationalization and explosion of organizations as vehicles of coordinated 
social action. 
The relatively fixed legal fabric in advanced capitalist societies is an 
emergent phenomenon never before present. Taken as a whole, the legal 











fabric enables and constrains an unfathomable range and number of 
interactions in society by supplying an assurance that law stands ready to be 
called on should something go wrong. Karl Llewellyn captured this in a 
comment about contracts: 
[T]he major importance of legal contract is to provide a frame-work 
for well-nigh every type of group organization and for well-nigh 
every type of passing or permanent relations between individuals and 
groups, up to and including states—a frame-work highly adjustable, 
a frame-work which almost never accurately indicates real working 
relations, but which affords a rough indication around which such 
relations vary, an occasional guide in cases of doubt, and a norm of 
ultimate appeal when the relations cease in fact to work.171 
His comment applies beyond contracts to the entire legal-regulatory realm. 
The assurance provided by the legal fabric holds even when, as often occurs, 
people have incorrect intuitions about law or they do not in fact resort to 
law when problems arise. Implicit trust owing to the presence of the legal 
fabric underwrites life in advanced capitalist societies.  
The legal fabric is an emergent infrastructure constructed through legal 
mechanisms that supports social, economic, and political dynamics in 
modern societies—a type of social connectivity—much like modern cities 
rely on physical infrastructures of roads, electricity grids, water lines, mass 
transit, waste disposal, and so forth.172 And akin to other forms of social 
connectivity, the legal fabric is pervasively interconnected with and 
interdependent on cultural, economic, political, and all other aspects of 
society.173   
E. A Rule of Law Society  
Theoretical discussions of the rule of law span a range of literatures, from 
legal theory,174 to political science,175 to development theory and practice.176 
At the core of debates over what the rule of law entails is an idea articulated 
by Friedrich Hayek seven decades ago. 
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Stripped of all technicalities this means that government in all its 
actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority 
will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.177 
Following Hayek, Joseph Raz identified the “the basic intuition” underlying 
the rule of law that “[the law] must be capable of guiding the behaviour of 
its subjects.”178 This requires that law be prospective, general, clear, public, 
and relatively stable. This also requires mechanisms necessary to effectuate 
legal rules: an independent judiciary, open and fair hearings without bias, 
review of legislative and administrative officials, and limitations on the 
discretion of police to insure conformity to law. 
Many accounts of the rule of law center on the common theoretical claim 
that law provides the populace notice of rules governing their conduct. 
However, if many lay people do not actually know the law because of legal 
complexity, the proliferation of law, and the obscurity of legal knowledge 
and practices, as I argued earlier, it is implausible to explain the rule of law 
in these terms.  
The rule of law is not only a topic of interest to theorists. Billions of 
dollars have been expended in recent decades to develop the rule of law in 
societies that suffer from its absence, with little evident success.179 The 
World Bank’s 2017 World Development Report, “Governance and the 
Law,” reaffirms the signal importance of law to society, while 
acknowledging that intransigent difficulties stymie efforts to develop the 
rule of law.180 The rule of law does not follow from judicial training 
programs or training police, from writing codes and regulations, from 
computerizing court systems, from training more lawyers, or any other 
common development approaches.181 Nor does the rule of law appear to 
consist of a necessary set of institutional arrangements. The United States 
has judicial review though the United Kingdom does not, for example, and 
the United States has many more lawyers per capita than Japan, while all 
three are considered rule of law countries. The enigma is how to build the 
rule of law in a society that lacks it. 
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Put in the simplest terms, the rule of law exists in societies in which the 
populace and government officials largely act consistent with the law. The 
rule of law today amounts to a society under law. The rule of law society as 
an emergent phenomenon is not about the legal system itself, but law and 
society together.  The evolution that led to its emergence transpired over 
millennia building on the first three emergent phenomena identified earlier 
and coinciding with the fourth. The very existence of the rule of law helps 
perpetuate the attitudes and institutions necessary to produce the rule of law. 
This comprises a loop of reciprocal causation in which individuals and their 
legally bound interactions produce a society under law, which encourages 
legally bound behavior of individuals and their interactions, which produces 
a society under law—with the lower-level actions and higher-level whole 
forming a mutually perpetuating relationship (though it can break down). 
With law and society developing in unison over time, this virtuous loop was 
not consciously created and cannot be intentionally duplicated when the 
emergent whole does not exist. 
A major plank of the rule of law society is in place from the outset. 
Individuals already generally act consistent with fundamental legal rules of 
social intercourse, for these rules are socially perpetuated through 
collectively shared actions, moral views, and cultural understandings 
(though violators and disputes inevitably arise). It does not matter that the 
details of official law are obscure to most people. If law generally comports 
in outcome with their moral views and intuitions about law, the populace 
acts consistent with law, although they are not actually guided by publicly 
declared law. Most people do not commit murder because they find it 
repugnant, not because the law punishes it. A general correspondence 
between intuitions about law held by the populace on fundamental rules of 
intercourse is what allows legal theorists (Hart, Hayek, Raz, and many 
others) to repeat that publicly declared law provides notice to the populace, 
though this is inaccurate. Law is not actually guiding behavior, but instead 
generally matches behavior. 
The hard part of the rule of law lies in two contexts outside the 
fundamental rules of social intercourse. The first is securing compliance of 
the populace with government legal dictates (taxes, conscription, safety 
standards, etc.). In addition to having a shared cultural orientation that 
people should be law-abiding, this can be obtained by a credible looming 
threat of coercive legal sanctions (though not in the face of sustained mass 
resistance). The second is securing adherence to law by government 
officials in their conduct toward the populace. The apparent dilemma this 
poses is that it cannot be maintained by force because government officials 














objection that the rule of law is illogical, for “he that is bound to himself 
only, is not bound.”182  
A sophisticated account of the development of the rule of law was 
provided by Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast. The crucial 
first step, according to their account, is that elites find it in their mutual self-
interest to subject themselves to an order of impersonally administered legal 
rules as a means to dampen intra-elite fighting, allowing them to focus on 
maximizing their economic return. “The ability of elites to organize 
cooperative behavior under the aegis of the state enhances the elite return 
from society’s productive resources—land, labor, capital, and 
organizations.”183 The authors call this “rule of law for elites.”184 Elites 
converted their privileges into rights enforced by legal institutions that 
guaranteed their ability to engage in open economic and political 
competition.185 The rule of law extended to society at large in mid-
nineteenth-century Britain and America, they assert, when it became 
possible for people to freely create and participate in “perpetually lived 
organizations” for economic purposes (through general incorporation laws) 
and political purposes (through open public offices and political parties) 
operating through and governed under impersonal legal rules.186  
Their illuminating account recognizes the significance of the rise of 
organizations for the rule of law. But it misses fundamental aspects of law, 
and of society, which have been essential in the development of the rule of 
law society.  A key factor giving rise to the rule of law was a centuries-old 
shared cultural view that everyone, including rulers, operated within a pre-
existing legal order.  In Medieval Europe, rulers were seen as subject to 
customary law, natural law, and ecclesiastical law, a shared understanding 
expressed in coronation oaths.  “These ceremonies, controlled and 
performed by the Church hierarchy, incorporated the secular Germanic idea 
that the king’s chief duty was to be guardian of the community’s law; in all 
the rituals the king promised to perform this duty faithfully.”187  Pepin said, 
“Inasmuch as we shall observe law toward everybody, we wish everybody 
to observe it toward us;” Charles the Bold swore, “I shall keep the law and 
justice;” Louis the Stammerer asserted “I shall keep the customs and the 
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laws of the nation.”188  Louis XIV stated in an ordinance in 1667, “Let it be 
not said that the sovereign is not subjected to the laws of his State; the 
contrary proposition is a truth of natural law…; what brings perfect felicity 
to a kingdom is the fact that the king is obeyed by his subjects and that he 
himself obeys the law.”189  The general expectation that rulers are 
accountable to law like everyone else provided a deeply rooted cultural 
foundation for the rule of law.   
The authors extensively discuss the evolution of property rights as 
pivotal to elite interests,190 while depicting this evolution in passive terms—
“the land law changed”191—with no attention to the impact of legal 
specialists and systematic legal knowledge. Property rights evolved in 
response to political and economic demands, to be sure, but excruciatingly 
slowly and within constraints of established procedures and concepts of the 
common law tradition maintained by jurists deriving income therefrom.192 
Law existed as a body of specialized knowledge with its own internal 
imperatives and consequences. Absent widespread belief among legal 
specialists that law genuinely exists apart from political and economic 
clashes (never mind regular deviations from this ideal)—without their 
commitment to maintain law’s system—there would have been no 
impersonal law to which elites could submit themselves. To function as 
impersonal law, individuals who staffed legal positions, judges in particular 
(who were societal elites as well), must have been steeped in and oriented 
to carrying out the law. Necessary for the rule of law is the presence of an 
entrenched tradition of specialists monopolizing legal knowledge (the third 
emergent phenomenon). Their account thus presupposes, without 
explaining, an essential condition for the emergence of the rule of law.193 
North, Wallis, and Weingast also miss several social developments 
significant in the emergence of rule of law societies.   They correctly 
emphasize that the ability to easily create and enter public and private 
organizations are central to democratic capitalist societies. For the rule of 
law specifically, however, the more salient point is that public and private 
organizations use law in nearly all aspects of their existence and interaction, 
so the profusion of law-using organizations brought a profusion of law 
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throughout society. Legal relations thereby thoroughly penetrated 
economic, political, and cultural arenas, flowing through and beneath all 
manner of public and private interaction. Everyone came implicitly to rely 
on the legal order in their myriad interactions with other individuals and 
organizations, rendering law a normalized background of social interaction 
(the fourth emergent phenomenon). The ubiquitous permeation of law 
within society has been a pivotal factor that coincided with and gave rise to 
the rule of law society.  
Another essential social development during the rise of organizations 
was the enhancement of bureaucratic rationality within organizations, 
which likewise took place in legal organizations, and the subsequent 
distribution of legal institutions and legal specialists across social arenas. 
Well into the nineteenth century, courts, prosecutors, and other government 
officials derived income from payments by private parties for public 
services; this practice was gradually abolished, replaced with regular 
salaries tied to offices. 194 Legal institutions became widely disbursed, 
spread across law schools rapidly increasing in number (from the final 
quarter of the nineteenth century), across a multitude of lawmaking, 
judicial, and prosecutorial offices at various levels and types (municipal, 
state, federal, agencies, etc.), and across private attorneys working solo, in 
firms, in government agencies, and as legal advisors within private business 
corporations. This disbursed proliferation resulted in the absence of central 
control for legal institutions. The solution to Hobbes’ objection—that a 
sovereign bound to itself is not bound—is that no singular sovereign creates 
and enforces law. A multitude of diffuse institutionalized locations of law—
staffed by legal specialists committed to law—in the aggregate hold 
government officials accountable to law.  
Finally, lengthy co-evolution entrenches the penetration of law 
throughout society.195  The interconnectedness of law within society yokes 
them together from both directions over time. Law interacts with and 
changes in relation to surrounding cultural, social, economic, political, and 
technological forces and competing social interests; these surrounding 
forces and interests build on, react to (avoiding or conforming), and 
intertwine their activities with law. The longer law and society have evolved 
together, the more thoroughly imbricated they become, in the aggregate 
constituting a rule of law society.  
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Rule of law societies are emergent wholes of relatively recent vintage, 
by this account, congealing into existence in decades spanning the turn of 
the twentieth century. Various aspects and manifestations of the rule of law 
go back millennia, but the existence of a rule of law society required social 
transformations that occurred with the rise of organizations in mass 
societies. It came about concomitant with the establishment of the fixed 
legal fabric. Though they emerged together in advanced capitalist societies, 
a rule of law society is not identical with the legal fabric. A legal fabric can 
exist alongside an authoritarian ruling polity that does not operate subject to 
legal constraints.  
Societies that lack the rule of law did not undergo the same evolutionary 
sequence as rule of law societies, needless to say, and each took its own 
uniquely different path. There are many possible barriers impeding the 
development of the rule of law, but five quick generalizations can be 
gleaned from this analysis. First, the fundamental rules of social intercourse 
in many of these societies are based on traditional customary and religious 
systems, while significant elements of their state legal systems have been 
transplanted through colonial imposition or voluntary borrowing. 
Consequently, a large schism exists in which a significant percentage of the 
population (in some places up to ninety percent)196 use a body of 
fundamental legal rules of social intercourse that diverge from state law. 
The general correspondence between fundamental rules and state-enforced 
law that rule of law societies take for granted does not exist. Second, much 
of the body of legal knowledge has been transplanted from elsewhere, its 
content built within the society of origin, and, therefore, it did not co-evolve 
for a lengthy period within the recipient society.  Though time has passed 
since initial transplantation, this has served to entrench the schism and the 
complex of actions in response to it by settlers and indigenous actors.  Third, 
they lack robust traditions of legal knowledge maintained by legal 
specialists. Fourth, they lack the ubiquity of bureaucratic organizations 
extensively using law and pervasive instrumental uses of law by 
government, so law is not a background aspect of society, and legal 
institutions and legal specialists are not widely distributed and 
decentralized.  Finally, they lack a longstanding and broadly shared cultural 
expectation that everyone, rulers included, are bound by and must act 
consistent with state law (though this orientation often exists toward 
customary and religious law).   
As a result of these five factors, state law is only partially interconnected 
within society; it lacks deep social roots and supportive cultural attitudes; it 
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suffers from a shortage of legal specialists committed to upholding law 
across a multitude of social, legal, economic, and political settings; and it 
cannot consistently hold government officials legally accountable. These 
entrenched aspects are the products of initial conditions and historical 
developments which resulted in present conditions and path-dependent 
dynamics that will not be erased. If the rule of law is to develop in these 
societies, they must evolve entirely novel arrangements built on their unique 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me close with a few words about why legal theorists should give 
greater attention to naturalism, historicism, and holism. A prominent legal 
philosopher recently claimed to produce a theory of law true for alien 
civilizations,197 while another invoked a society of angels to analyze the 
features of law,198 both undeterred by the fact that they know nothing about 
aliens or angels beyond what is supplied by their imaginations. Economic 
efforts to explain law typically posit independent, mutually indifferent, self-
interested rational actors engaging in transactions, building up law 
therefrom, never mind that this scenario strips away much of what gives rise 
to legal orders. The naturalistic discussions in this essay show that, to 
understand what generates and gives shape to law, one must attend to its 
roots in natural human traits and life in social groups. What historicism 
emphasizes is that law has undergone profound changes over time in 
connection with the evolution of human societies. This runs contrary to 
claims by prominent contemporary analytical jurisprudents that they have 
identified necessary features of law for all times and places.199 Finally, the 
lesson of holism is that law cannot be reduced to a set of features distinct 
and apart from surrounding social influences because they course through 
its every pore and are integral aspects of law. Holism is antithetical to legal 
philosophers who assert, like Joseph Raz:  
Since a legal theory must be true of all legal systems the identifying 
features by which it characterizes them must of necessity be very 
general and abstract. It must disregard those functions which some 
legal systems fulfil in some societies because of the special social, 
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economic, or cultural conditions of those societies.200 
Against this position, holism holds that law cannot be abstracted from or 
understood without attention to surrounding social, economic, cultural, 
political, technological and ecological conditions.  All five of the emergent 
phenomena addressed in this essay involve changing configurations of law 
within society from the beginning of human history to the present. Any 
theory of law not informed by naturalism, historicism, and holism inevitably 
will be inadequate. 
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